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In two cases involving disputes over the value of condemned property,
the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed judicial review of a commissioner's
award. The first case, State Highway Commissioner v. Foster,' interpreted
Section 46.21 2 of the condemnation statute 3 'to require a commissioner to
base his award both on his own view of the property and on testimonial
evidence.4 The Court addressed the issue of how closely related the final
award must be to these two types of evidence, concluding that an award
cannot be arbitrary and capricious, but must bear a "reasonable relation-
ship" to both types of evidence presented. The Court explained that what
constitutes a "reasonable relationship" depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case.5 As a general guideline, however, a com-
missioner will not be held strictly to testimonial evidence, even though it
may include appraisals of expert witnesses. 6 The second case, State Highway
& Transportation Commissioner v. Carter,7 adhered to the established stand-
ard of judicial review of a commissioner's award, stating that "'the report
of the commissioners is entitled to great weight, is prima facie correct, and
must be confirmed unless 'good cause be shown against it.' '" 8
Although Foster and Carter impose no new limits on commissioners'
freedom, the two cases are important in revealing a great deference to the
findings of the commissioners. Such deference is evidenced by the use of the
"arbitrary and capricious" and "prima facie" standards noted above, both
of which place a greater burden of proof on the party contesting the com-
missioner's award.9 The affirmations of the awards in Foster and Carter are
further evidence of this deference. The practical effect of the Court's ap-
1 216 Va. 745, 222 S.E.2d 780 (1976).
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.21 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
3 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.1 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1973).
4 216 Va. at 747-48, 222 S.E.2d at 782.
5 Id. at 748, 222 S.E.2d at 782. State Highway & Transp. Comm'r v. Carter, 216 Va. 639,
222 S.E.2d 776 (1976), also used this standard of review. See note 7 infra and accompany-
ing text.
6 216 Va. at 748-49, 222 S.E.2d at 782-83.
7 216 Va. 639, 222 S.E.2d 776 (1976).
8 Id. at 641, 222 S.E.2d at 777, citing Kornegay v. City of Richmond, 185 Va. 1013, 1024,
41 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1947).
9 See generally 9 WIGMORE ON EvmENcE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
1469
HeinOnline -- 62 Va. L. Rev.  1469 1976
1470 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 62:1469
proach, therefore, may be to insulate the commissioners' awards from
meaningful appellate review.10
B. Landlord-Tenant
In Monterey Corp. v. Hart I the Supreme Court of Virginia held a tenant
not liable for loss due to fire where the lease did not reveal a clear intention
by the tenant to assume such risk. In so ruling, the Court clarified the
relationship among common law rules, a state exculpatory statute, and
lease provisions allocating liability between landlord and tenant for losses
to the leasehold resulting from fire. Plaintiff, the landlord, sued the tenant
for fire damages to the leased premises allegedly caused by tenant's negli-
gence. A clause in the lease provided that the "[ljessee will keep . . . the
premises in as good order and condition as the same now are, reasonable
wear and tear and damages by accidental fire excepted." 12 The Court
held that the lease provision exempted the tenant from any liability for
damages caused by a fire not intentionally and unlawfully started by him.13
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined Section 55-226 of the
Virginia Code14 to decide whether it overrode the allocation of liability
provided in the lease. Recognizing that the purpose of Section 55-226 was
"to abrogate the harsh common law rule which placed liability for all loss
or damage to the leased premises on the lessee, regardless of fault," 15 the
Court concluded that the statute did not impose upon the tenant any addi-
tional liability. 16 Evaluating the intent of the parties in defining their obli-
gations, the Court determined that the phrase "accidental fire" as em-
ployed in the lease included those fires negligently started, thus relieving
the lessee from responsibility for his own negligence. 17
Hart demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Virginia has shifted its
analytical approach to leases from traditional estate notions to contract
principles. 1 Instead of perceiving the lease as an estate, the Court em-
10 See 216 Va. at 642-44, 222 S.E.2d at 779-80 (Carrico, J., dissenting).
11 216 Va. 843, 224 S.E.2d 142 (1976).
12 Id. at 844, 224 S.E.2d at 143.
13 Id. at 851, 224 S.E.2d at 147.
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-226 (Repl. Vol. 1974) (lessee who covenants to pay rent or keep
premises in good repair need not do so when fire destroys premises unless fire is due to
fault or negligence of lessee and unless lease manifests a different intent).
15 216 Va. at 845, 224 S.E.2d at 144.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 850-51, 224 S.E.2d at 147.
18 Traditional property analysis would have placed liability on the tenant, no matter
what caused the fire, unless the lease explicitly stated otherwise. Under the traditional
analysis courts perceived the lease as a conveyance of an interest in land; thus, they
viewed a fire as damaging the tenant's present, possessory estate and the landlord's non-
possessory future interest. For a discussion of the traditional and modern approaches to
leaseholds, see Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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ployed contractual notions in its constructionf of the lease, such as the
reasonable expectations of laymen.19 The result of this change in approach
is a shift of liability from the tenant to the landlord.20 A contrary construc-
tion of the lease, which would have required both lessor and lessee to carry
fire insurance,21 would have fostered inefficiency. Hart thus reflects one of
the main rationales for relieving the tenant of liability: the need to achieve
a more economical allocation of risk.
C. Nonpossessory Interests
During the survey period, several cases restated traditional rules of prop-
erty in the area of non-possessory interests. 22 In Phipps v. Leftwich,23 the
most significant case, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided that a grant
of mineral rights did not permit the owner of those rights to strip mine the
property, absent explicit authorization. Because strip mining was unknown
in the county where the property was located at the time the original
parties executed the deed, the Court concluded that these parties only
contemplated the use of underground mining.24 Although recognizing that
appellants could exploit developments in modem technology, the Court
declared that "[a] change . . .from underground mining, which leaves the
19 216 Va. at 850-51, 224 S.E.2d at 147.
20 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown
v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The Court's interpretation of Section 55-226 further illus-
trates the shift in liability from the tenant to the landlord. See notes 14-17 supra and
accompanying text.
21 216 Va. at 846-47, 224 S.E.2d at 145.
22 In Janel Corp. v. Coastal Inv. Corp., No. 75-1600 (4th Cir., Feb. 10, 1976), the
Fourth Circuit restated the traditional formula for measuring damages when an encum-
brance breaches a covenant in a deed. In Haynie v. Brenner, 216 Va. 722, 222 S.E.2d
546 (1976); the Supreme Court of Virginia, after restating the requirements necessary for
the creation of an easement by implication, focused on the requirement that the easement
be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Because convenience
is not tantamount to reasonable necessity, the Court decided that no easement by im-
plication arose. Id. at 724, 222 S.E.2d at 548. In a third case, Bruton v. Wolter, 216 Va.
311, 218 S.E.2d 438 (1975), the Court applied the established rule that restrictive cove-
nants should be strictly construed against those trying to enforce them. Bruton exempli-
fies the modem trend to allow free, unimpeded use of land in order to achieve maximum
utilization of resources. In Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 681, 222 S.E.2d 522 (1976), the Court
ruled that language included in the land sales contract, but not in the deed of con-
veyance, created a revocable license, not an easement. Because licenses are not assign-
able, subsequent purchasers from the licensee could not enforce the right granted in the
sales contract to use a swimming pool. The Court reasoned that because the deed was
silent about the right of use, the grantor never intended the right to extend to subse-
quent purchasers.
23 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
24 Id. at 711, 222 S.E.2d at 540.
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surface substantially usable by the owner of the freehold, to surface mining,
which destroys what was reserved by the grantor, is not permissible." 25
Because of the increase in demand for coal as an energy source, Phipps
is a significant decision. By limiting strip mining, Phipps represents a victory
for conservationists. 26 This triumph, however, may prove hollow. The Court
in Phipps applied in its analysis of grants of mineral rights the ad hoc test
employed in Pennsylvania and Kentucky.27 Under this approach courts con-
strue the grant by determining the intent of the parties according to the
particular circumstances of each case.28 Whether the original parties knew of
the practice of strip mining would be one of the circumstances that the court
would consider.29 Unfortunately, the Court did not reconcile one of this
test's possible outcomes-that strip mining would be allowed-with the con-
flicting philosophy, expressed in the opinion, that the owner of mineral
rights should not destroy the grantor's reserved estate. This problem must
await future resolution.30
In Mid-State Equipment Co. v. Bell 31 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the equitable doctrine of implied restrictive covenants precluded
the owner of a parcel of land from using the property commercially. The
deed conveying the land to the defendant-appellant had declared that the
25 Id. at 713, 222 S.E-.2d at 541.
26 See, e.g., 216 Va. at 711-12, 222 S.E.2d at 540:
We have been unwilling to construe a deed so as to hold that the owner of a
mineral estate has the right to destroy the surface, unless such right has been
expressed in unmistakably plain terms.
This language is indicative of a strong policy to conserve the land.
27 Compare, e.g., Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), and Martin v. Ken-
tucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968), with Rochez Bros. v. Duricka, 374
Pa. 262, 91 A.2d 825 (1953). Department of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal &
Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968), is a good example
of a court construing a deed by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the instrument. Although the deed did not expressly grant the right to
strip mine, the Maryland court ruled that the parties did not intend to exclude it because
the process was a known, practical method. Another reason for the decision was the
condition of. the land; it was rocky, remote, unfit for agriculture, unimproved, and gener-
ally valueless once the defendant removed the coal and timber.
28 216 Va. at 714-15, 222 S.E.2d at 542.
29 Id. at 713, 222 S.E.2d at 541, citing, e.g., Department of Forests & Parks v. George's
Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968).
30 For an unusual solution to this balancing question see Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin,
376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954). In Fitzmartin the court reasoned that the damage caused
by strip mining would be only temporary because the mountainous terrain would fall
within coverage of the Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act, Pamphlet
L. 1198, No. 418 (1945), as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1 et seq. (1949),
which required the miner to fill in the open pit within one year and plant trees, shrubs,
and grass within three years after the operation was completed. Therefore, the court held
that strip mining was permitted. 376 Pa. at 398, 102 A.2d at 896-97.
31 217 Va. 133, 225 S.E.2d 877 (1976).
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parcel was not subject to the residential use restrictions affecting a neigh-
boring subdivision.3 2 Moreover, in response to a request from the defendant-
appellant, a realtor had advised that the residential restrictions did not
apply to the land.33 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the parcel in
question was subject to the residential use limitations. In reaching this
decision, the Court reaffirmed the long-established doctrine that
"when, on a transfer of land, there is a covenant or even an in-
formal contract or understanding that certain restrictions in the use
of the land conveyed shall be observed, the restrictions will be
enforced by equity, at the suit of the party or parties intended to be
benefited thereby, against any subsequent owner of the land except
a purchaser for value without notice of the agreement." 34
According to the Court, the intent of the original grantor determines
the existence of an equitable right to enforce the restrictive covenants. To
ascertain this intent the Court considered "the words used in the re-
striction, the plats, the deeds, such surrounding circumstances as the parties
are presumed to have considered when their minds met, the purpose to be
achieved by the covenant, and the use of the property .... ,, 35 The Court
concluded that the facts demonstrated an intent by the original grantor to
create a general scheme of residential development including the parcel in
controversy.36 Moreover, the Court determined that the defendant-appellant
at least had inquiry notice of these restrictions because of the information
discoverable by a ground view of the property. The fact that in the instant
case the inquiry had led to an erroneous conclusion did not establish lack
of notice.3 7
32 The deed stated: " 'This land is specifically not subject to subdivision restrictions of
record of Jefferson Manor.' " Id. at 139, 225 S.E.2d at 883.
33 Id.
.4 Id. at 140-41, 225 S.E.2d at 884, quoting Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 37-38, 138
S.E. 545, 548 (1927). The doctrine of reciprocal servitudes or negative easements originated
with Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
35 217 Va. at 141, 225 S.E.2d at 884.
36 Id. at 142, 225 SXE.2d at 885. Of particular importance to the Court were the facts
that the grantor had previously used the property in question for residential purposes and
had intended the property to be reserved for such use, that the restrictions were sub-
stantially uniform, and that even though the parcel appeared as two unnumbered lots on
the plat of the subdivision the residential restrictions on the plat referred to "[a]ll lots
in this subdivision," not all numbered lots. In addition, a previous conveyance by the
original grantor to the defendant-appellant's seller had referred specifically to the plat with
the restrictions. Id.
37 Id. at 143, 225 S.E.2d at 885. See also Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 232-33, 206
N.W. 496, 498 (1925). The dissent in Mid-State Equipment reasoned that the deliberate
exclusion of the land in question from the numbered lots on the plat implied that the
grantor did not intend to subject the land to the residential restrictions. It also concluded
that the purchaser should not be put on inquiry notice because the probability of
14731976] Property
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Mid-State Equipment restates Virginia's law on implied negative ease-
ments.38 The decision is important because of its application of this theory
to a situation involving performance by the purchaser of his duty to in-
quire. Since the purchaser in Mid-State Equipment exhausted all pre-
cautionary measures before buying the land, the case serves as a warning
to attorneys to be cautious in similar situations.
D. Land Sales
Two cases during the survey period dealt with option contracts for the
sale of land. The first, Pruner v. Brown,39 stated Virginia's position on the
interpretation of the lease phrase "first right to purchase." There are two
lines of authority on the proper construction of this phrase.40 One theory
holds that the word "first" is a term of art creating an option (a right of
first refusal). According to this theory, if the lessor plans to sell, he must
offer the realty to the lessee first.41 A second theory refuses to accept "first"
as a term having one established legal meaning. Instead, it determines the
meaning of the phrase from an examination of the circumstances and facts
surrounding the whole document. 42
In Pruner the lease contained more than the phrase "first right to pur-
chase." It specified the purchase price, the terms and manner of financing,
and the period during which the right could be exercised. 43 Believing that
the second line of cases was more likely to ratify the true intentions of the
parties, the Court applied that approach and concluded that the specificity
of the lease revealed an intention to sell, thus creating an option.4"
The second case, Wood v. Wood,45 differentiated an option contract from
a contract to sell with a condition precedent. Holding that the agreement
in issue was a bilateral sales contract rather than an option contract, the
discovering that the restrictive easement applied to the parcel was too low. 217 Va. at 143-
44, 225 S.E.2d at 885-86 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
38 The Virginia law on reciprocal negative easements is similar to the established law
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935).
See generally RE TATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 539, 541-f (1944); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 9.24-.40 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes
in Land, 28 VA. L. R.v. 951 (1942).
39 216 Va. 885, 223 S.E.2d 890 (1976).
40 For a discussion of these two divergent lines of cases, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1158
(1954).
41 Id. at 1160 & n.6, citing, e.g., Stein v. Reising, 359 Mo. 804, 224 S.W.2d 80 (1949),
R.I. Realty Co. v. Terrell, 254 N.Y. 121, 172 N.E. 262 (1930).
42 216 Va. at 887, 223 S.E.2d at 892, citing Tantum v. Keller, 95 N.J. Eq. 466, 123 A.
299 (Ch.), aff'd, 96 NJ. Eq. 672, 126 A. 925 (1924). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d at 1161.
43 216 Va. at 886, 223 S.E.2d at 891.
44 Id. at 887, 223 S.E.2d at 892.
45 216 Va. 922, 224 S.E.2d 159 (1976).
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Court decided that a provision allowing the purchaser to rescind the
contract "at his sole option" if he were unable to have the property rezoned
merely created a condition precedent.4 6 According to the Court, "[t]he
whole tenor of the instrument [was] one of sale .... , 47Wood reveals the
Court's preference for interpreting ambiguous land sale documents as
bilateral contracts rather than as options.4 8
In another land sales case, Miller v. Reynolds, 49 the Supreme Court of
Virginia decided that a condition in the sales contract did not merge into
the deed. The dispute arose when the sellers refused to cancel the conveyance
after a condition contained in the sales contract failed. 0 The deed made
no mention of the condition, but the sellers had made an express representa-
tion, orally and in writing, that the condition would be fulfilled easily.
Despite the general rule that the provisions of a sales contract merge into
the deed and do not survive the closing,51 the Court recognized that deeds
seldom contain all the provisions customarily found in contracts to convey,
that the condition was the main inducement to buy, and that the condition
did not qualify or affect the title to the land.52 Thus, the Court affirmed
the equitable decree of the trial court granting rescission and cancellation
of the conveyance.
Two cases during the survey period discussed remedies for breach of a
land sales contract. The first, Reid v. Allen,53 analyzed specific performance
as a remedy. Three of four tenants in common had executed a sales agree-
ment for their land. When the fourth refused to execute the same contract,
the purchaser sought specific performance from two of the original tenants
for one-half interest in the land. In denying the purchasers' request for
specific performance, the Court found that a sale of one-half of the land
was never contemplated by any of the parties to the agreement 54 and ob-
served that specific performance should have been sought against all of the
vendors.55 Though a traditional remedy for breach of a contract to sell
land, specific performance is not available to force parties to do what they
never contemplated.
46 Id. at 925, 224 S.E.2d at 161.
47 Id.
48 Id., citing Shirley v. Van Every, 159 Va. 762, 167 S.E. 345 (1933).
49 216 Va. 852, 223 S.E.2d 883 (1976).
50 In the real estate purchase contract, the sale had been conditioned upon the buyer
obtaining a building permit and percolation for a septic system. Id. at 853, 223 S.E.2d at
884.
51 Id. at 854, 223 S.E.2d at 885, citing 8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 4458 (Repl. Vol. 1963).
52 216 Va. at 855-56, 223 S.E.2d at 885.
53 216 Va. 630, 221 S.E.2d 166 (1976).
54 Id. at 632, 221 S.E.2d at 168-69.
55 Id. at 633, 221 S.E.2d at 169.
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The second case, Ingram, Inc. v. Lunsford,56 suggested that an award of
damages would be an appropriate remedy for breach of a sales agreement
resulting from subsequent inability to perform. Seller, a tenant by the
entirety, executed a contract to sell his real estate. When the seller's wife
refused to sign the deed, the buyer sued the seller for contract damages.
The Court concluded that although the seller could not convey good title
without his wife's signature, he was, nevertheless, answerable in damages for
his failure to perform because legally he could contract to sell that which
he did not own. 57
E. Miscellaneous 58
In McCauley v. Phillips 59 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the
problem of allocating liability for the natural consequences of land develop-
ment. The dispute arose when the appellee improved his land by installing
a drain pipe, which subjected the appellants' lower land to drainage from
surface water. The Court affirmed the lower court ruling that the appellants
must bear the loss for damages to their property. Asserting that surface
water was a "common enemy" against which each landowner could pro-
tect,60 the Court noted that there was no evidence of substantial damage
to appellants' land.61 Although recognizing "that a landowner may not
collect surface water into an artificial channel and discharge it in concen-
trated form upon the land of another to his injury," 62 the Court upheld
the right of every property owner reasonably to develop his property with-
out being liable for the natural consequences of such development.63
McCauley, however, neglected to define what constitutes reasonable develop-
ment of property, an essential question that now must await future resolu-
tion.
56 216 Va. 785, 224 S.E.2d 129 (1976).
57 Id. at 786, 224 S.E.2d at 130. The Court precluded the possibility of specific perform-
ance as a remedy. Id. at 787, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
58 For a recent restatement of Virginia's law on adverse possession, see Walton v.
Rosson, 216 Va. 732, 222 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
59 216 Va. 450, 219 S&E.2d 854 (1976).
60 Id. at 453, 219 S.E.2d at 858. Virginia has adopted a modified version of the common
enemy doctrine. Under this rule surface water is considered to be a common enemy against
which each landowner may guard, provided that the protection used does not unnecessari-
ly or wantonly damage the property of another. 6A AMERICAN LAW Or PROPaRTY §
28.63, at 189 (A. J. Casner ed. 1954). For a recent reaffirmation of Virginia's stance on the
surface water drainage problem see Seventeen, Inc. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 205
S.E.2d 648 (1974). A substantial number of states, however, follow one of two other
rules. For a thoughtful discussion of all three rules see Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396,
412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
61 216 Va. at 455, 219 S.E.2d at 859.
62 Id. at 454, 219 S.E.2d at 858.
63 Id. at 453-54, 219 S.E.2d at 858.
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II. LEGISLATION
A. Eminent Domain
The General Assembly made several important changes in the eminent
domain statutes.64 First, the legislature amended Section 83.1-89 65 by ex-
plicitly imposing an affirmative duty on the State Highway and Transporta-
tion Commissioner to disclose to property owners all foreseeable property
damage or enhancement resulting from highway construction. The amend-
ments provide specific standards for evaluating the adequacy of information
disclosed in a briefing with the property owner. 66 The amended statute also
implicitly requires the commissioner to negotiate, though not necessarily
agree to, a settlement with owners of property not taken under eminent
domain, but subject, nevertheless, to prospective damage from highway
construction. 6 7 By imposing an affirmative duty on a state official, the
General Assembly has taken a bold step towards protecting property owners
who heretofore may have been unaware of the full consequences of highway
construction.
Another change in an eminent domain statute 68 lessens the requirements
for exchanging property with a railroad or a public utility. The amended
statute permits the Department of Highways and Transportation to acquire
land to exchange for land owned or occupied by any railroad or utility
under a claim of right or with the apparent acquiescence of the private
landowner. Prior to the amendment, the Department could execute an
exchange of land only if the utility or railroad had a property interest in
the land. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Virginia previously had ruled that
a power company could not be reimbursed for relocating transmission lines
from condemned land when those lines had been erected merely with the
landowner's permission. In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that
the company's permits were licenses, not property interests, which were
64 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-89 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1976).
65 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 430, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-89 (Repl. Vol.
1976).
66 Adequate briefing includes:
(i) the giving of plats and profiles of the project, showing cuts and fills, together
with elevations and grades; (ii) explanation, in lay terms, of all proposed changes
in profile, elevation and grade of highway and entrances, including the elevations
of proposed pavement and shoulders ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
67 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1976) ('In negotiating with a proper-
ty owner with respect to payment for prospective damage to property not taken incident
to the purposes of this section ...."), with id. ("[Tihe requirements of this section ...
shall in no way be construed . . . to create any right to compensation.")
68 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 380, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-96 (Repl. Vol.
1976).
1976] Property 1477
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revoked by the condemnor. 69 The amendment remedies this situation by
allowing reimbursement for the loss of mere occupancy.
B. Land Sales
The General Assembly amended Section 11-2 70 to require a writing by
the party to be charged for brokerage contracts. The Supreme Court of
Virginia previously had held that oral brokerage contracts for the sale of
realty were service contracts and therefore not within the Statute of Frauds
provisions governing the sale of land.71 In rejecting the Court's approach,
this amendment supplies the same protection against fraudulent, perjured
claims that the Statute of Frauds normally provides.
C. Mortgage and Foreclosure
During the survey period, the General Assembly increased the flexibility
in the statutes governing mortgage and foreclosure. One amendment 7 2
grants new discretion to the trustee under a deed of trust in the event of a
default on a debt secured by property. Before the amendment, the trustee
was required to take possession of the property and sell it if so requested
by any beneficiary. The amendment now permits the trustee to exercise dis-
cretion in deciding whether to allow a debtor to remain in possession. The
amendment also insulates the trustee from unintentional waiver of an ac-
celeration clause by allowing the written notice of a proposed sale to operate
as an exercise of the right of acceleration.
Amendments to Section 55-60 7 also increase flexibility by providing
that the phrase "reinstatement permitted" as used in any deed of sale shall
be construed to permit the creditor to accept delinquent payments or other
cure of default even after he has exercised his right of acceleration. The
amendments grant creditors more leeway.
(9 Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Fugate, 211 Va. 745, 180 S.E.2d 657 (1971), discussed in
Property, 1970-1971 Virginia Survey, 57 VA. L. REv. 1552, 1552-53 (1971).
70 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 157, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(6a) (Supp.
1976).
71 Reich v. Kimnach, 216 Va. 109, 216 S.E.2d 58 (1975), discussed in Property, 1974-
1975 Virginia Survey, 61 VA. L. REv. 1834, 1839 (1975).
72 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 257, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (6) (Supp. 1976).
73 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 155, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-60 (Sa) (Supp.
1976).
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TRUSTS AND ESTATES
I. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Powers of Appointment
In Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank 1 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the donee of a power of appointment must comply strictly with
the donor's requirement that the donee refer specifically to the power
when executing it. The trustee of the deceased donor's estate requested the
Court to decide whether the power of appointment over the corpus of a
marital trust had been exercised effectively by the will of the donee.2 The
trust, established by the donor's will, paid the income from its corpus to the
donee (the donor's wife) for life.3 With respect to disposition of the corpus
the donor's will provided:
My wife ... is hereby given ... a general power of appointment, by
specific reference to the powers granted herein, in her will, in favor
of her estate, or, at her election, in favor of any other party. . ..
The donor's will stated further that if the donee failed to execute the ap-
pointment, the unappointed corpus was to become part of the residual
trust to be distributed among the issue of the donor's brothers.5
The will of the donee, prepared when she was fully cognizant of her
power of appointment, 6 bequeathed all of her estate to her sister, "be it real,
personal or mixed, or in which I may have a power of appointment of
1 216 Va. 482, 219 S.E.2d 868 (1975).
2 Id. at 483, 219 S.E.2d at 870.
a The Court explained the purpose of the arrangement:
Donor's will, read against the background of death tax laws, indicates that his
purpose was to provide for his wife during her lifetime and, thereafter, for the
remaindermen he named. For the benefit of both, he wanted to avail his estate of
the maximum marital deduction permitted by federal estate tax laws and regula-
tions. To accomplish this, it was necessary to couple his wife's life estate with a
general power of appointment. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b)(5). To validate the
deduction, the power of appointment must be tailored to fit the rules prescribed by
the tax regulations. A donor's requirement that the power must be exercised "by
specific reference to the power" does not defeat the deduction. Treas. Reg. §
20.2056 (b) -5 (g) (4). Donor adopted this requirement and then designated the
beneficiaries to whom his property would pass in the event his wife failed to
exercise the power in the manner required.
Id. at 486, 219 S.E.2d at 872.
4 Id. at 483, 219 S.E.2d at 870.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 483-84, 219 S.E.2d at 870.
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whatsoever nature. ... 7 In analyzing whether this provision of the donee's
will effectively exercised the power of appointment, the Court first evaluated
the effect of the donor's requirement that specific reference to the power
be made in the donee's will. The general rule in Virginia has been that a
donor may impose special requirements on the manner in which a donee
must execute a power of appointment.8 The Court rejected the appellant's
argument that the General Assembly had modified this general rule by
statute.9 The Court concluded that the requirement that the donee make
specific reference to the power of appointment did "not entail 'some addi-
tional or other form of execution' within the intendment of Code § 64.1-
50." 10 Thus, noncompliance with the particular requirement invalidated
the appointment.
The appellant also contended that by operation of law the residuary
clause of the donee's will constituted a valid exercise of the power to ap-
point."' In response the Court narrowed Section 64.1-67 of the Virginia
Code to exclude situations where the donor explicitly imposes special re-
quirements upon the exercise of the general power to appoint. 12 The
7 Id. at 483, 219 S.E.2d at 870.
8 Id. at 484, 219 S.E.2d at 871.
9 See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-50 (Repl. Vol. 1973), providing:
No appointment made by will, in exercise of any power, shall be valid unless the
same be so executed that it would be valid for the disposition of the property to
which the power applies, if it belonged to the testator; and every will so executed
shall be a valid execution of a power of appointment by will, notwithstanding the
instrument creating the poiver expressly require that a will made in execution of
such power shall be executed with some additional or other form of execution or
solemnity.
10 216 Va. at 486, 219 S.E.2d at 872. The Court interpreted Section 64.1-50 to mean
that an exercise of the power of appointment by will is effective if the donee exercises
his will in accordance with all the formalities required by law. Furthermore, if the
donee complies with these formalities, the appointment is valid even though the donee
failed to fulfill some additional form of execution. The Court decided, without explana-
tion, that the requirement of specific reference was not "some additional or other form
of execution" as intended by the statute. Id. at 485-86, 219 S.E.2d at 871-72.
11 Id. at 485, 219 S.E.2d at 871, citing VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67 (Repl. Vol. 1973), which
provides:
A devise or bequest shall extend to any real or personal estate . . .which the
testator has power to appoint as he may think proper and to which it would ap-
ply if the estate were his own property, and shall operate as an execution of such
power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.
12 216 Va. at 485, 219 S.E.2d at 871. The Court construed Section 64.1-67 to mean that
a general residuary clause in the donee's will effectively exercises a general testa-
mentary power of appointment, unless a contrary intention exists in the donor's will.
Although the Court failed to explain why it concluded that the statute was inapplicable
to the Holzbach facts, it probably reasoned that the imposition of a special requirement
on the general power was sufficient evidence of a contrary intention.
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Court's statutory interpretations combine to mandate strict compliance with
the donor's requirement. In considering whether such compliance existed
in the donee's will, the Court announced that the test was "not whether
donee intended to appoint but rather whether donee manifested her intent
in the manner prescribed by the donor, i.e., by making specific reference
'in her will' to the power granted by donor's will." 13 Applying this test to
the facts, the Court concluded that the donee's will made only a general
reference to powers of appointment and thus failed to comply with the
donor's requirement. 14
In a strong dissent two justices contended that strict adherence to the
donor's directions is not always required and often is undesirable. 15 The
dissent argued that the Treasury did not intend its regulation permitting
a donor to require specific reference to the power of appointment 16 to be
a technical tool depriving the donee of the power, but rather intended it
to assure the donor that the donee would exercise the power consciously
and knowingly. The dissent asserted that the language of the donee's will
manifested such a consciousness. 17
One can criticize the Court for failing to justify its statutory interpreta-
tions. First, the Court's interpretation of Section 64.1-50 does not clarify
what "additional or other form of execution" is within the intendment of
that section. The Court's construction may be explained only as an attempt
to ease a rather recent tension between the section and the marital deduction
provision of the federal estate tax laws.18 Though for tax purposes a husband
or wife might give his or her spouse a general power of appointment, the
donor frequently encumbers that power in the hope that the encumbrance
will thwart a valid execution of the power.19 The donor thus gains a tax
advantage but assures ultimate delivery of his estate to the intended re-
cipient. jurisdictions having statutes such as Section 64.1-50, which in-
crease the flexibility of the donee in exercising the power of appointment,
therefore must decide whether this increased flexibility should apply to
donors attempting to exploit the tax break allowed by the marital trust
13 Id. at 485-86, 219 S.E.2d at 871 (emphasis in original).
14 Id. at 487, 219 S.E.2d at 872.
15 Id. at 488, 219 S.E.2d at 873 (Harrison and Cochran, JJ., dissenting).
16 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b) -5 (g) (4) (1939).
17 216 Va. at 487, 219 S.E.2d at 872-73. The dissent reasoned that the donee's language
deliberately distinguished between her property and the appointive property. The dissent
also pointed out that powers of appointment are favored in Virginia and that a general
power of appointment is designed to be a flexible tool, the use of which should be en-
couraged. Id. at 488, 219 S.E.2d at 873.
IS INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2056.
19 See Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. RiEv. 339, 373
(1959).
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provision.20 Apparently the Supreme Court of Virginia has concluded that
such a statute should not limit the donor's power.
A second difficulty inheres in the Court's interpretation of Section 64.1-67.
This statute, as well as its forerunner in case law, Machir v. Funk,21 allows
a general power of appointment to be executed by a residuary clause of the
donee's will. Commentators have criticized this rule22 because it pre-
sumes not only that the donee intended to exercise the power, but also that
he intended to appoint to the residuary devisee or legatee of his estate a
general testamentary power.23 The rule also leads to theoretical inconsisten-
cies in the law of power of appointment.24 Unfortunately, Holzbach leaves
unclear the scope and continued validity of the rule in Virginia.
Holzbach's statutory interpretations permit several power of appoint-
ment problems to linger. The opinion injects formal stumbling blocks into
the drafting of wills by requiring strict compliance with the donor's con-
ditions. Because of this holding practitioners in Virginia should review the
power of appointment provisions in the wills of their clients to insure com-
pliance with Holzbach's insistence on form as well as substance.
B. Resulting Trusts
Two cases during the survey period reviewed Virginia's requirements for
the creation of a resulting trust. In Salyer v. Salyer 25 the Supreme Court
of Virginia found that a resulting trust had been created; in Muth v.
Gamble26 the Court held otherwise. Both cases applied the "clear and
20 Id.
21 90 Va. 284, 18 S.E. 197 (1893), cited in Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank, 216 Va.
482, 485, 219 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1975). Machir held that a residuary clause in the will of a
donee of a power of appointment operates as an execution of that power, unless the will
evidences contrary intention.
22 See L. SmEs & A. SMiTH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 973, at 430 (2d ed. 1956);
Note, Powers of Appointment in Virginia, 47 VA. L. Rr v. 711, 721-22 (1961). Apparently
this principle is the minority rule.
23 See, e.g., Note, supra note 22, at 721-22.
24 For example, in Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 198
Va. 130, 92 S.E.2d 503 (1956), cited in Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank, 216 Va. 482,
484, 219 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1975), the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to presume that a
donee intended to blend his assets with the appointive property; the residuary clause rule,
however, necessarily presumes this. See Note, supra note 22, at 722; see generally Sparks,
supra note 19, at 370-72.
25 216 Va. 521, 219 S.E.2d 889 (1975). In this case two brothers purchased two parcels
of real estate; although the two had agreed that each would farm separately, they recorded
the title for each tract in both names so they could more easily obtain a loan. The
equities clearly were with the surviving brother rather than with the heirs of the de-
ceased brother.
26 216 Va. 436, 219 S.E.2d 894 (1975). This case involved a suit brought by two of the
deceased's grandchildren over some real property conveyed by their mother to their
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convincing evidence" standard to the question of whether a resulting trust
existed.27
Several important factors influenced the Court's determinations in Salyer
and Gamble as to whether the evidence was clear and convincing. First, the
Court noted that if a deceased person holds legal title to disputed realty,
Section 8-286 of the Virginia Code 28 requires corroboration of any evidence
purporting to establish a resulting trust.29 Second, the Court determined
whether any facts contradicted the evidence offered as proof of the establish-
ment of a resulting trust and considered the strength of that contradicting
evidence.30 Third, the Court considered the equities of the particular case,
taking into account the character and behavior of the parties involved.3'
These three factors clarify some of the aspects of the "dear and convincing"
standard.
C. Cy Pres
In United States v. Hughes Memorial Home 32 the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Virginia concluded that racially discriminatory
terms of a trust benefiting an orphanage violated the Fair Housing Act of
1968,33 but permitted the dominant intent of the trust to survive by re-
moving the racial restrictions. The settlor established the trust in 1922 to
organize and maintain "an orphanage for the white children of the States
of Virginia and North Carolina . . . ." 34 Acting in good faith the trustees
interpreted this provision to preclude non-whites from becoming residents.3 5
Subsequently, the United States brought suit, alleging that the children's
home violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by making dwellings unavail-
able to black children.
grandmother, and then purportedly conveyed to a third grandchild. The sole question
presented was whether the mother's conveyance of her property to the grandmother, which
was without consideration, created a resulting trust.
27 216 Va. at 525, 219 S.E.2d at 893; 216 Va. at 440, 219 S.E.2d at 898. For a judicial
definition of "clear and convincing evidence" see 216 Va. at 525 n.4, 219 S.E.2d at 893 n.4.
28 VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-286 (Rep1. Vol. 1957).
29 216 Va. at 522-23, 219 S.E.2d at 891; 216 Va. at 439-40, 219 S.E.2d at 896-97.
30 216 Va. at 527, 219 S.E.2d at 894; 216 Va. at 440, 219 S.E.2d at 897-98.
31 216 Va. at 526-27, 219 S.E.2d at 893-94; 216 Va. at 440, 219 S.E.2d at 897-98.
32 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975).
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
34 396 F. Supp. at 547 n.2.
35 Because of the exclusion of non-whites from the orphanage, and in light of recent
civil rights legislation, public welfare departments had to cease making referrals to the
home. Also as a consequence, the home no longer received assistance from such federal
programs as the milk program. Thus, the home was operating substantially below its
capacity and at a loss. Id. at 548.
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The federal district court held that although the discriminatory policies
required by the trust violated the Fair Housing Act, the home could con-
tinue to operate by disregarding the racial restrictions. 36 In reaching this
decision the court recognized that a Virginia statute 37 favored the applica-
tion of the cy pres doctrine.3 8 This doctrine is
[t]he principle under which the courts thus attempt to save a chari-
table trust from failure by carrying out the more general purpose of
the testator and carrying out approximately though not exactly his
more specific intent .... 39
The reasoning underlying the cy pres doctrine is that "[t]he testator would
presumably have desired that the property should be applied to purposes
as nearly as may be like the purposes stated by him rather than that the
trust should fail altogether." 40 Only by identifying the racial restrictions as
incidental to the trust's main purpose could the court apply the cy pres
doctrine.41 Hughes Memorial Home apparently is the first application of
Virginia's cy pres doctrine to a document with racial restrictions.
D. Wills 42
In Papen v. Papen43 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the statute
revoking all provisions in a will in favor of a spouse divorced a vinculo
matrimonii applied to "wills executed and divorces obtained before, as well
as after, the effective date of the statute." 44The statute, Section 64.1-59, 45
had been enacted after the testator's divorce but prior to his death; the will
had been executed before the divorce. The plaintiff-appellee, the testator's
sister, maintained that the law in effect at the date of the testator's death
36 Id. at 552-53.
37 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-31 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
38 396 F. Supp. at 552-53. Accord, Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1963);
see also Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63 S.E.2d 786 (1951).
39 IV A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRusTs § 399, at 3084 (3d ed. 1967); accord, VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-31 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
40 IV A. Scorr, supra note 39, § 399, at 3084.
4' 396 F. Supp. at 552-53.
42 Two cases during the survey period dealt with the interpretation of particular pro-
visions in wills. In the first, Walker v. Clements, 216 Va. 562, 221 S.E.2d 138 (1976), the
Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the phrase "to use as he sees fit" as conveying only
a life estate, not an estate in fee simple absolute, even though a layman drafted the
phrase. In the second, Maiorano v. Virginia Trust Co., 216 Va. 505, 219 S.E.2d 884 (1975),
the Court concluded that where the plain meaning of the words in the will reveals an
intent to postpone vesting of the estate, the testator's intent governs despite general
policies favoring early vesting.
43 216 Va. 879, 224 S.E.2d 153 (1976).
44 Id. at 884, 224 S.E.2d at 156.
45 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-59 (Repl. Vol. 1973). This statute provides: "If, after making
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should determine the revocation of the will.4 6 The defendant-appellant,
the divorced spouse of the testator, argued that the law in effect at the time
of the divorce should control.4 7 The Court acknowledged the general
principle that statutes apply prospectively, but held that here retroactive
application would infringe no rights because rights do not vest until a will
is probated. 48 Moreover, retroactive application would better serve the
purposes of the statute by reflecting "the presumed intent of a testator that
any provision in his will for the benefit of his spouse be terminated in the
event of their divorce." 49 Practitioners should note that Papen places on
the testator the burden of acting affirmatively to preserve provisions for a
divorced spouse.
In Harris v. Harris " the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the dis-
appearance of the testator's will had created a rebuttable presumption of
revocation, which the advocates of the will had failed to rebut with clear
and convincing evidence. Such a presumption develops when a will in the
testator's possession or accessible to him cannot be found after his death.51
Noting that the testator had continued to be physically active in his home
long after the will's custodian had discovered the will missing from its
hiding place in the testator's home, the Court concluded that the will was
accessible to the testator and, therefore, that the presumption of revocation
had arisen.5 2 In reaching this conclusion the Court announced the rule to
be "one of possibility, not probability, of such access by the testator." 53
Furthermore, the Court observed that since the custodian was the chief
beneficiary, the presumption of revocation was strengthened, thus making
the burden of proof upon the proponents of the will even greater. Pro-
ponents failed to meet this burden because, although they raised other
possible causes for the will's disappearance, their evidence did not clearly
establish their theories.5 4
a will, ihe testator is divorced a vinculo matrimonii, all provisions in the will in favor of
the testator's divorced spouse are thereby revoked."
46 216 Va. at 881-82, 224 S.E.2d at 155. See In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 587, 264
P. 12 (1928).
47 216 Va. at 880, 224 S.E,2d at 154. See Wilson v. Francis, 208 Va. 83, 155 S.E.2d 49
(1967).
48 216 Va. at 882, 224 S.E.2d at 155.
49 Id.
50 216 Va. 716, 222 S.E.2d 543 (1976).
51 Id. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 545.
52 Id. at 719-20, 222 S.E.2d at 545.
53 Id. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 545.
54 Id. at 720, 222 S.E.2d at 546.
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II. LEGISLATION
A. Powers of Personal Representative
The General Assembly significantly amended 55 Virginia's incorporation
by reference statute.56 This statute, the Commonwealth's answer to the
growing problem of inadequate drafting of wills and trust provisions,57
provides an extensive list of powers that may be incorporated in whole or
in part by reference to the statute. One amendment, Section 64.1-57(1)(al), 58
augments this list by permitting the fiduciary to accept additions to the
estate from any source and to administer these additions in the same manner
as the rest of the estate. This amendment follows a growing trend towards
facilitating the use of inter vivos trusts and pour-over wills by allowing
testamentary additions to existing trusts. 59 Other additions to the list include
Section 64.1-57(l)(bl), 60 permitting incorporation of the power to grant, sell,
transfer, exchange, purchase, or acquire options of any kind on property,
and Section 64.1-57(1)(s),61 allowing the fiduciary to exercise discretion in its
choice of alternative tax schemes relating to the payment of taxes or assess-
ments accrued to the estate.
Section 64.1-57 (3) 62 allows the fiduciary of an irrevocable document to
disclaim the right to exercise any power incorporated by this statute. Should
a fiduciary disclaim its powers, the disclaimer relates back to the moment
the fiduciary assumed its duties. The disclaimer is irrevocable and therefore
binding on any successor fiduciary. Finally, Section 64.1-57 (4) 63 provides
that unless there is a contrary intention the incorporation by reference of
powers listed in the incorporation by reference statute will refer to powers
existing at the time the party executed the instrument, rather than to those
existing at the time of the testator's death.
55 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Supp. 1976).
56 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
57 See generally T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILlS AND TRUSTS 233-35
(1972). Other states adopting this solution include Arkansas, Connecticut, North Carolina,
and Tennessee. Id. at 235.
58 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(l)(al) (Supp.
1976).
59 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (al) (Supp. 1976), with UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §
2-511 (1975). See also T. SHAFFER, supra note 57, at 74-76.
60 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(1)(bl) (Supp.
1976).
61 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(l)(s) (Supp.
1976).
62 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(3) (Supp.
1976).
63 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 419, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (4) (Supp.
1976).
HeinOnline -- 62 Va. L. Rev.  1504 1976
1976] Trusts and Estates 1505
An important new provision increasing the flexibility of a trust is Section
64.1-57.1,64 which permits the state circuit court to grant personal represen-
tatives any or all of the trust powers that may be incorporated by reference
pursuant to Section 64.1-57, provided that such grant is not contrary to the
testator's intentions.65 Added to salvage poorly drafted instruments that
fail to give personal representatives sufficient powers, this section could
serve as a progressive model for other states.66
These amendments to the incorporation by reference statute reveal
Virginia's continuing efforts to compensate for inadequate draftsmanship.
Although commentators have criticized incorporation by reference statutes
as inviting fraud and as being too encompassing and detailed,6 7 these
statutes save time and eliminate much litigation over the interpretation of
wills.6 8
4 Va. Acts of Assembly 1976, ch. 437, codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57.1 (Supp.
1976).
65 According to the new statute, factors that a court should consider in deciding whether
to grant any powers include:
whether the personal representative was nominated by the decedent or by the
beneficiaries; the number and capacity of the beneficiaries and their ability or
inability to consent to the acts of the personal representative which are otherwise
within the scope of § 64.1-57; the relationship of the personal representative to the
beneficiaries; the character of the estate to be administered ...
Id.
66 See also UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. 7, pt. 4 (1975) (General Comment); T. SHArFFR,
supra note 57, at 236.
67 See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WiLs § 80, at 386 (2d ed. 1953);
T. SHAFFER, supra note 57, at 285-36. Professor Shaffer has criticized such statutes as being
too exhaustive in that indiscriminate incorporation of the enumerated statutory powers
into the will by the draftsman may create problems for the trustees. In a Tennessee
statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-616 to -619 (Supp. 1975), for example,
investment powers and distribution powers were drawn so broadly . . . that their
use in a marital-deduction trust will imperil the deduction, under both the income
requirements of [Internal Revenue Code] Sec. 2056(b) (5) and the distribution-in-
kind requirements set in Revenue Procedure 64-19.
T. SHAFFER, supra note 57, at 235.
68 T. SHAFFER, supra note 57, at 285.
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